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Abstract
Presupposition failures are errors occurring during the leftright processing of a computer program or
natural language text A general method for analysing such errors with dynamic logic is presented
based on the idea that sequential processing changes context dynamically and that this process of
context change can be made the object of analysis in dynamic modal logic
   CR Subject Classication F F I I	
Keywords and Phrases semantics of natural language presupposition semantics of programming
error analysis modal logic dynamic logic knowledge representation languages
Note to appear in M Kanazawa C Pi
non H de Swart eds Quantiers Deduction and Context
CSLI Stanford
  Introduction
Updating a state of information with a statement bearing a presupposition can be viewed as a combination
of two things i checking whether the presupposition holds in the current context and provided this is
the case ii updating the current state of information with the informational content of the statement
In case the presupposition is not fullled in the current context one might adjust the context to make
it hold and next do the further update with the informational content of the statement These two
actions are obviously ordered First the context is adjusted to accommodate the presupposition next the
information state is updated with the assertion Context and information state are used interchangeably
here and indeed we can view the context which gets updated as a state of information
We propose to view the study of presupposition failure from the general perspective of updating infor
mation structures van Benthem 	

	 de Rijke 	

 Jaspars to appear In this perspective providing
information is a dynamic process involving a speaker and an audience which gets the audience from an
initial information state to a new more informed state or in case the new information is inconsistent with
the current state to the absurd information state
It turns out that in many cases the information update relation is functional In such cases presupposition
failure can be catered for by switching to a partial update function In case the presupposition of some
update is not met in some information state the update function yields undened for that update in
that state But information updating is not always functional Communication mismatches do occur if
the new information is too vague to yield a unique update in the current information state In such cases
the audience will have to indicate that the update cannot be processed without further ado Note that
this is dierent from the communication mismatch which occurs if the new information hinges upon a
wrong assumption about the current context the cases of presupposition failure
The point that presupposition has to do with information updating has been made again and again

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in the literature Stalnaker and Karttunen come to mind as early proponents of the view that pre
supposition projection should be accounted for in dynamic terms See Stalnaker 	
 Stalnaker 	

Karttunen 	
 Karttunen 	
 Karttunen and Peters 	

 and Heim 	
 Modern versions of this
approach appear in Beaver 	

 van Eijck 	

 Krahmer 	

 and Zeevat 	


Stalnaker proposes the following explanation of the rule rst stated in Karttunen 	
 that the pre
supposition of a conjunction AB consists of the presupposition of A conjoined with the implication
ass
A
  pres
B

The explanation goes like this   when a speaker says something of the form A and B he
may take it for granted that A   after he has said it The proposition that A will be added to
the background of common assumptions before the speaker asserts that B Now suppose that
B expresses a proposition that would for some reason be inappropriate to assert except in a
context where A or something entailed by A is presupposed Even if A is not presupposed
initially one may still assert A and B since by the time one gets to saying that B the context
has shifted and it is by then presupposed that A
From Stalnaker 	
 p 		 also quoted in Heim 	


Modern versions of the dynamic approach to presupposition all attempt to formalize the pragmatic
notion of presupposition ie the notion of presupposition where a presupposition is a presupposition
of the speaker about the context when heshe utters a sentence in that context rather than a property
of the sentence itself On the other hand inappropriateness of a sentence in a given context can be
construed as lack of a denite truth value of that sentence in that context and the presupposition of a
sentence can always be viewed as a statement which holds in precisely those contexts where the sentence
is appropriate
We should distinguish therefore between talking about what holds in given states of information on
one hand and about updating information states on the other It is precisely here that dynamic logic
which distinguishes between a level of static description and a level of procedural description and which
provides means of relating these two description levels becomes an illuminating tool The dierence
between the present analysis and other recent dynamic approaches to presupposition is the focus on the
link between statics and dynamics which relates semantic presupposition to pragmatic presupposition
 Information Structures
An information structure I is a pair hSvi with S a nonempty set of information states and v a preorder
transitive and reexive but not necessarily antisymmetric over S which is called the information order
If L is a language for S then an Linformation model M is a triple hSv i where   L   PS is a
specication function which interprets the language L in S Classical languages can be specied by a
single function  but for languages of partial logic one needs pairs 
 
 
 
of such functions and so on
We consider the simplest case rst the case of propositional logic where the states of information are
sets of propositional valuations Let a set of proposition letters P be given Then the set of valuations is
the set f 	g
P
 Call this set W  Members of W may be considered as epistemically possible worlds
An information state is a subset of W plus a member of W the distinguished member plays the role of
the actual world or the current perspective of the knowing subject the set S of all information states
is fhi wi j i  Ww  Wg The information ordering v on S is given by
hi wi v hj w

i i i  j and w  w


Note that this gives a partial order not just a preorder Note also that we do not demand w  i if
hi wi is an information state In particular h wi is an information state namely the absurd information
state viewed from perspective w Without perspective worlds it would be more awkward to modally
characterize inconsistent information With the use of a perspective world we can simply say that  
characterizes an inconsistent belief state
Information states can be viewed as K models sets of possible worlds with an almost universal
accessibility relation ie transitive and almost reexive and almost symmetric for the perspective
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world need not be accessible from itself To be precise K logic is complete for transitive and euclidean
frames a relation R is euclidean if xRy and xRz together imply that yRz
K models are appropriate to talk about the kind of belief where one has complete information about
ones own uncertainty for more information about this see Moore 	
 An appropriate local language
L to talk about information states is the language of propositional modal logic
   j p j  j 

 

 j 
We employ the usual abbreviations for 	 
  The specication function  for the language is
given by
  
p  fhi wi  S j wp  	g
  S  


 

  

  


  fhi wi  S j w

 i with hi w

i  g
We say that s j  i s   Note that hi wi j   i i   An information state h wi is absurd or
inconsistent if we are in such a state nothing at all is compatible with what we know or believe Any
boxed formula is true in an absurd information state indeed hi wi  h wi i there is a formula   L
with hi wi j  
An information state hWwi is an information state of complete ignorance a state of having no information
at all If P is innite there is no formula of L which characterizes W  for nite P there is If P 
fp

     p
n
g let C be the nite set of all conjunctions of form p

     p
n
 Then
hi wi j
 
C i i W
 Updating Propositional Information
Updating a state of information with a new piece of information can be viewed as moving up in the
information order toward some more informed state Propositional updates are just tests performed
in the current perspective world Epistemic updates can shift the information state updating the
information of ones audience with  F will get the audience in a state where F is known ie a state
where  F holds Similarly downdating with  F will get the audience in a state where F is not known
anymore ie in a state where F holds
In the more general perspective on information structures neither updates or downdates need to be
minimal cf van Benthem 	

	 and de Rijke 	

 but for present purposes this restriction is useful
Minimal updates are given by

u
  fhs s

i  S  S j s v s

 s

 
s

 S  s v s

v s

 s

  s

v s

g
We will use F  G F

    as metavariables for purely propositional formulas of L As it turns out the
minimal update relation for L is functional for updates of the form  F or F 
We may assume that knowing subjects unless they are allknowing cannot distinguish the actual world
from any other of their epistemic alternatives so updates with purely propositional F are a bit silly they
can succeed only if they do not change states and their success depends on what is true in the actual
world
Example  An update with p  q in state hi wi checks if i w j p  q and succeeds if this is the case
fails otherwise In other words this update succeeds i wp  	 or wq  	
If I utter p q this should be understood as I believe or know that p q and I want you to accept that
information about the world too So this update should be understood as having an implicit   in front
Example  An update with  p  q in state hi wi causes a shift to a state hj wi where j  fw

 i j
hi w

i j p  qg
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Example  An update with p q in state hi wi does not change state in case hi wi j p q and
otherwise fails
Updates with F formulas are consistency tests they check whether the information F is consistent
with the current information state Let kk
i
be fw  W j hi wi  g The following proposition
holds
Proposition 
	 F
u
  fhs si  S  S j s j Fg
  F
u
  fhhi wi hi kFk
i
 wii j hi wi  Sg
 F
u
  fhs si  S  S j s j Fg
Example  An update with  p   q in state hi wi is not functional in case i contains a w

with
w

p  	 w

q   and a w

with w

p   w

q  	 In this case there are two possible outcome
states s

 hfw

 i j w

p  	g wi and s

 hfw

 i j w

q  	g wi
Take for example the case where s  hfpq pqg wi where p indicates that p is false Both
hfpq pqg wi   hfpqg wi
and
hfpq pqg wi   hfpqg wi
are minimal updates
Modal updates are discussed in Veltman 	

	 but with the constraint that only modal updates of the
forms 	   F and  F are allowed Our 	   F corresponds to Veltmans might F and our  F
to his F  so the   is left implicit in his notation Updates of the form 	   F are total functions
while updates of the form F may be partial In fact an update with 	  F will eect a transition
to an inconsistent state if F does not hold in the current state Any update of the form  F 
WV
F
i
where F and all the F
i
are purely propositional is functional An important result about K by the
way is that every formula has an equivalent formula of the form
W
F  G 
V
H
i
 where F  G and
the H
i
are all purely propositional This follows from the completeness of K with respect to nite
balloon frames ie frames where the accessibility relation is transitive and euclidean these frames have
the shape of a balloon of mutually accessible worlds all accessible from a single perspective world See
eg Chellas 	
 for more information Disjunction over   is the feature that threatens functionality
The functional K formulas are honest formulas in the sense of Halpern and Moses 	
 A formula
is honest if one can honestly claim that one only knows that formula This is equivalent to saying that
a minimal update of the state of complete ignorance with that formula is functional Claiming that you
only know  p  q is a cheat because in order for that to be a true statement you either have to be in
a state where all the accessible worlds are p worlds and in that case you also know p or you have to be
in a state where all the accessible worlds are q worlds and in that case you also know q
A K formula  is persistent if hi wi j  and hi wi v hj wi together imply that hj wi j  Formulas
of the form  F are persistent formulas of the form F  with F a consistent propositional formula are
not Conjunctions and disjunctions of persistent formulas are persistent Every persistent formula is K
equivalent to a disjunction of conjunctions of formulas of the forms F and  F F purely propositional
Example  p is true at hWwi but false at any information state hi wi without p worlds
The persistent and functional K formulas are precisely the formulas of the form F

 F

 F

and F

purely propositional up to K equivalence
Conversely we can look at minimal downdates to move back to a state where  does not hold anymore
Minimal downdates are given by

d
  fhs s

i  S  S j s

v s s

 
s

 S  s

v s

v s  s

  s

v s

g
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The minimal downdate relation is not functional for formulas of the form  F  and it is a test for formulas
of the form F 
Example   p
d
 will relate a state hi wi satisfying hi wi j  p to any state hj wi where j is of the
form i  fw

g with w

p   and a state hi wi not satisfying hi w i j  p to itself
Downdates with formulas of the form F can only succeed in case F is inconsistent with the current
information state
Example  p
d
  fhs si  S  S j s j pg
In general we have
Proposition 
	 F
d
  fhs si  S  S j s j Fg
  F
d
  fhs si  S  S j s j  Fg  fhhi wi hi  fw

g wii j hi wi  S hi wi j  Fw


W  kFk
i
g
 F
d
  fhs si  S  S j s j Fg
Over the local language L we now layer a global language L

 which is the language of the information
structure S L has a procedural and a propositional level the procedures are minimal updating
minimal downdating testing plus sequential compositions of those the propositions of L

are built
from the formulas of L which act as atoms of L

 using boolean combination and procedure projections
   j p j  j 

 

 j 
  
u
j 
d
j  j 




   j  j 

 

 j  j dom  j ran  j x 
The interpretation of L

consists of two parts a relational interpretation for the procedures and a truth
denition for the formulas The interpretation for the procedures and formulas uses mutual recursion

u
  as given above

d
  as given above
  fhs si  S  S j S s j g




  

  


In the nal clause  denotes relational composition
S s j  i s j 
S s j  i S s j 
S s j 

 

 i S s j 

and S s j 

S s j  i s  hi wi and
there is some w

 i with S hi w

i j 
S s j dom  i s

 S  ss

S s j ran  i s

 S  s

s
S s j x  i ss
This system is an extension of the system of update logic presented in Veltman 	

	 with tests downdates
and a more liberal regime concerning modal updates Alternatively it can be viewed as a fragment of a
structured version of the Dynamic Modal Logic DML in van Benthem 	

	 with structured states in
this case K models instead of unstructured propositional valuations but with just a subset of the
procedural repertoire
We can dene the perhaps more familiar dynamic logic style procedure modalities hi and  in terms
of the projection operators and tests as follows
hi
def
 dom 

def
 dom  
Note that it follows from these denitions that
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 S s j hi i s

 S  ss

and S s

j 
 S s j  i s

 S  ss

implies S s

j 
Note the following important dierences
S s j  never
S s j 	 always
S s j   i s  h wi
S s j 	 i s  h wi
Example 	 We see from the above that  expresses that no  transition is possible while  
expresses that the only possible  transition will get one to the absurd information state or in other
words that the transition  yields inconsistency
Example 
 hi	 expresses that a  transition is possible hi	 expresses that a consistent  transition
is possible
The notion of validity for L

is as follows
 j  i for all s  S  S s j 
Because we have used the full space PW to dene the state set S there is no need to mention S as a
parameter in the validity notion once the set of proposition letters is xed the set of information states
is xed This changes when we allow S to be a proper subset of
fhi wi j i  PWw  Wg
subject to certain conditions Nothing in the notion of information structure prevents us from doing
this as long as we make sure that the information ordering v on S remains a preorder We will not
explore this possibility here however
 Some Example Validities
We will not present a full axiomatisation of the logic of propositional up and downdating but merely
give some of the valid principles that we can use to reason about information transitions Next to the
obvious axioms and rules of inference of propositional logic of normal modal logic for  we need the
following
P       
P     
Principles 	 and  are the principles of positive and negative introspection of K for 
P  dom 
 dom 	
P  ran 
 ran 	
These are to make sure that we can always assume dom arguments to be of the general form  and
ran arguments to be of the general form 
P  

  

  

  


This is the K schema for  which expresses that for every information transition procedure  the operator
 is a normal modal operator
P  h
u
i	 
 h
u
i
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This expresses that after updating with   will hold The principle does not entail that updates have
the property of right seriality for every s there is a t with st for we have seen that this need not be
the case for  of the forms F or F 
P  F
u

 F   
P 	 F
u

 F   
These express that F and F updates are tests
P 
 h F
u
i G
  F
u
 G
  F   G
The soundness of Principle 
 follows from the functionality of  F updates plus the next proposition
Proposition  s j  F
u
 G i s j  F   G
Proof hi wi j  F
u
 G
i hi  kFk
i
 wi j  G
i hi  fw

j w

j Fg wi j  G
i w

 i if w

j F then w

j G
i hi wi j  F   G
P  h F
u
iG
  F
u
G
 F G
The soundness of Principle 	 follows from the functionality of  F updates plus the next proposition
Proposition  s j  F
u
G i s j F G
Proof hi wi j  F
u
G
i hi  kFk
i
 wi j G
i hi  fw

j w

j Fg wi j G
i w

 i w

j F and w

j G
i hi wi j F G
P  F
d

 F 
P  F
d

 F  
These express that F and F downdates are tests
The following principle is a rule rather than an axiom schema
P 

V
C FG
ran  FG
u
G

Here
V
C is the conjunction of all formulas of the form p

     p
n
 where p

     p
n
are the
proposition letters occurring in FG
P  ran F
u

   F 
P  ran F
u

  F 
P  ran  F  G
u

  F G
After updating a context with a persistent update the persistent preconditions will hold in the new
context
P  ran F
d

   F 
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P 	 ran F
d

   F 
P 
 ran F

    F
n
 G
d

 F

    F
n
G
The counterparts to the previous three for downdates
P  h
d
i	 
 h
d
i
This expresses that a downdate can only succeed if after downdating with   does not hold anymore
Note that downdating will be impossible if the downdate is a logical validity the present setup is
unsuitable for modelling unlearning of logical truths
P  x 
u

 
This expresses that updating with  doesnt change the context precisely when  already holds
P  x 
d

 
This expresses that downdates with information that is already known to be false have no eect
P  x 
 x 
 x   
This is an obvious statement about xpoints
P  x     dom   ran 
This relates xpoint to domain and range
P  x 

  x 

  x 




If s is a xpoint for 

and 

 then s is a xpoint for 



but note that this cannot be strengthened
to an equivalence
P  dom 




 dom 

 dom 


This is the usual principle for sequential composition Stated in terms of hi it can also be expressed as
h



i
 h

ih

i familiar from Prattstyle propositional dynamic logic
P  ran 




 ran ran 




This is the counterpart to the previous principle Finally here are three axioms about testing
P 	 dom 




 

 


P 
 ran 




 

 


P  x 
 
It should be noted that some of these principles can be simplied if we extend the relational repertoire
of the language For example if we admit procedure intersection then we can dene xpoints by means
of x  
 dom  	 Of course the tradeo is that now extra principles for intersection have to
be added
 Validity and Consequence
While there is an obvious static validity notion for the logic of propositional information transitions see
above there are several candidates for the notion of dynamic valitity van Benthem 	

	 Veltman 	

	
van Eijck and de Vries 	

 which are all easily expressible in the present format
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An information transition  is always accepted if for every information state s hs si   This is the
case i for every information state s s j x 
An information transition  is always acceptable if for every information state s  h wi there is some
s

 h wi with hs s

i   This is the case i for every information state s s j 	  hi	
Similarly while it is clear what the static notion of logical consequence should be namely  j  i for
every s  S with s j
V
 it holds that s j
W
 there are several candidates for dynamic consequence
in this framework van Benthem 	

	 see Kanazawa 	

 for further analysis
 

j



i for all s  S s

s implies s

s
 

j



i for all s s

 S with s

s

and s

 h wi there is an s

 h wi with s



s


 

j
	


i for all s s

 S s

s

implies s



s


These are readily expressed in terms of static validity for we have
 

j



i j x 

  x 


And for the second one
 

j



i j 

	  h

i	
And the third one
 

j
	


i j ran 

  x 


 Information Conveyed by an Update
One way of measuring the information conveyed by an information transition in a state satisfying  is
by means of ran 
Example  The information conveyed by the update p
u
  p
u
one of Veltmans key examples
in the state of complete ignorance is calculated as follows
ran 	 p
u
  p
u
 
 ran ran 	 p
u
  p
u


 ran p p
u


  p
The second step uses Principle 	 the third Principle 	
Example  The information conveyed by the update  p
u
 p
u
in the state of complete ignorance
is calculated as follows
ran 	  p
u
 p
u
 
 ran ran 	  p
u
 p
u


 ran ran  	  p
u
 p
u


 ran  p p
u


  p p
This is K equivalent to  which shows that this update will never succeed Note the use of Principle
	 in the third step
In fact since updating with Veltmans might p corresponds to updating with 	   p the rational
reconstruction of Veltmans example is slightly dierent
Example  The information conveyed by the update
 p
u
 	  p
u
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in the state of complete ignorance is calculated as follows
ran 	  p
u
 	  p
u


 ran ran 	  p
u
 	  p
u


 ran ran  	  p
u
 	  p
u


 ran  p 	  p
u


  p 	  p
This is K equivalent to   which shows that this update will get the audience in an inconsistent state
of information
To see that the nal step in the calculation is correct note that the update procedure 	   p
u
is
equivalent to the procedure 	p
u
 
u
 where  denotes choice between procedures An obvious
principle governing choice is
ran 

 

 
	

 ran 



  ran 


	

Using this and the other principles the nal step can easily be validated
In general a transition  is consistent in state s i hi	 holds in s This expresses that a transition
from s via  is possible which does end up in a consistent state of information
It is tempting especially in the light of the dynamic consequence notion j

 to equate the information
conveyed by an information transition  with x  But note that the combination p
u
 p
u
does
not have a xpoint while as we have just seen updating with that information starting from complete
ignorance yields a consistent information state Is there perhaps something funny about updates of the
form F
u

From the present perspective such updates are indeed strange Recall that our intention is to model the
knowledge of an audience addressed by a single speaker If one assumes that F
u
corresponds to an
assertion by the speaker then the update would have to correspond to an assertion about the state of
knowledge of the audience the speaker states that F is consistent with what the audience knows already
This assertion would correspond to something like I take it that you know that F is possible But this
is not an assertion in the sense of statement inuencing the state of knowledge of the audience
Compare this with the updates of the form p may be the case or maybe p in Veltman 	

	 Veltman
renders the assertion maybe p as an update with 	   p The big dierence between Veltmans
information states and ours is that Veltmans information states model the knowledge of a single agent
reporting on how he or she processes incoming information while ours model the knowledge of the
audience addressed by a single speaker
In our setup updates of the form 	  p are not consistency checks of ones own knowledge as they
are for Veltman but statements about the knowledge of the audience Since we cannot in general assume
that a speaker has complete knowledge of what his or her audience believes such statements are rather
pointless On the other hand checking the knowledge of the audience by means of a test  may still
make eminent sense as we will see in the next section
In the present setup an assertion of the form maybe p should be construed as an invitation to the
audience to reconsider the truth of p ie such an assertion is a downdate and it has the form p
d

or equivalently  p
d

If one imposes the constraint that information transitions always be compositions of basic units of the
forms  F
u
and  F
d
 possibly interspersed with tests then information content can always be described
in terms of xpoints A consistent xpoint for p
u
 p
u
does not exist but for  p
d
 p
u
it does
indeed any state where  p holds is such a xpoint
 Expressing Presuppositions
We have seen that realistic information transitions in our setup have the forms  F 
u
or  F 
d
 In case
such an information transition has a presupposition we may assume that this has the form of a test to
see whether something is known in the current context ie a test of the form   Not only updates
may have presuppositions witness 	
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	 Maybe the king of France is eating frog legs
If I assert 	 then I presuppose that the king of France exists and I invite my audience to revise
their belief that his majesty is doing something other than eating frog legs We have seen that maybe
statements turn up as downdates of the form  F
d
in the present framework So this is a downdate
with presupposition
The framework presented above has all the machinery in place to express presuppositions We can express
the requirement that updating with  has presupposition  in state s by means of the complex update

u

Example   p q
u
succeeds in state s i s j  p and eects a transition to a state s

with s v s

and s

j  q And of course also s

j  p for  p is a persistent formula
The semantic clause for 
u
 is given by

u
    
u

 fhs s

i  
u
 j s j g
 
u
 fhs s

i  S  S j s j g
As the relational interpretation demonstrates 
u
is interpreted as an update with  under the pre
supposition that  holds in the current context Similarly 
d
is interpreted as a downdate with 
under the presupposition that  holds in the current context
Calculating the presupposition of an information transition  consists in nding a specication of the
information states s for which there is an s

with hs s

i   In these cases we say that the transition
 does not abort Conversely the presupposition failure conditions of an information transition  consist
of a specication of the information states s for which there is no s

with hs s

i   We say in these
cases that transition  aborts in state s
To calculate the presupposition of an update 
u
 we have to check the conditions on states s under which
the relation 
u
 does have a successor for s These are given by the following schemata which are
derivable from the principles in the previous section
T  h
u
i	 
   h
u
i	
This expresses that a simplex update with presupposition can be performed if and only if the presup
position holds in the current information state and the update without presupposition is possible in the
current context
T  h
d
i	 
   h
d
i	
This expresses that a downdate under presupposition is possible i the presupposition holds in the
current information state and the downdate without presupposition is possible in that state Note that
the presupposition of an information transition is nothing but the weakest preconditions for success of
that transition in the well known computer science sense
For a concrete example assume that the lexical presupposition of being a bachelor consists of being male
plus being adult We do not yet look inside the basic propositions built from these predicates so we
merely say that example  presupposes the conjunction of  and  and asserts 
 Jan is a bachelor
 Jan is male
 Jan is adult
 Jan is unmarried
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Basic propositions that do not themselves have presuppositions can be represented using basic proposition
letters Let us use p for  q for  and r for 
The update for Jan is a bachelor does have the presuppositions Jan is male and Jan is adult and after
the update with these presuppositions it makes the assertion Jan is unmarried so it can be represented
as  p  q r
u
 Let P be the set fp q rg Information states for this fragment are built from
valuations in fp q rg   f 	g
  Jan is male Jan is a bachelor
The meaning of the update with the sequence   is given by  p
u
 p  q r
u
 We write this out
to check its meaning
s p
u
 p  q r
u
s

i s

 s p
u
s

and s

 p q r
u
s

i s

 s p
u
s

and s

j  p  q and s

 r
u
s

i s

 s p
u
s

and s

j  q and s

 r
u
s


It follows from this that the nonabort condition on s is given by
s

 s p
u
s

and s

j  q
This is the case i s j  p   q In other words the presupposition is that it is known in the current
context that if Jan is male then he is adult We can also derive this in the calculus as follows
h p
u
 p  q r
u
i	 
 h p
u
ih p  qih r
u
i	

 h p
u
i p  q

  p  q
p

  p  q
An information transition  holds in a context if the transition does not aect that context For the
example case we can spell out the conditions for this as follows
s p
u
 p q r
u
s
i s

 s p
u
s

and s

 p q r
u
s
i s p
u
s and s p  q r
u
s
i s j  p and s j  p  q and s j  r
i s j  p  q  r
To end this section note that the present perspective sheds an illuminating light on the phenomenon
known as presupposition accommodation Presupposition accommodation is the process performed by a
benevolent audience in case an assertion is made with a presupposition which does not hold in the current
context In case the audience does not know that Bill is married and someone gossips that Bills wife
wants a divorce then the context is tacitly updated with the presupposition of that assertion as well If
we allow complex updates by an obvious extension of the language we can model this accommodation
process as a shift from transition  to transition hi	
u

 Embedded Presuppositions
Until now we have only considered presuppositions under sequential composition If we assume presuppo
sitions to have the form  F  then a typical sequential composition of two updates under presupposition
looks like this
 F

 G
u

 F

 G
u


The presupposition of this is given by
h F

 G
u

 F

 G
u

i	
This reduces to
 F

 h G
u

ih F

i	
and further to
 F

 G

  F


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with end result
 F

 G

  F


Thus we see that the boxed presupposition of the sequential composition of two updates is given by
conjunction of the boxed presupposition of the rst and the boxed implication of assertion of the rst
and presupposition of the second
To consider presuppositions under negation let us forget about downward transitions  for the moment
Note that we cannot dene the negation of a downdate with  as the assertion that downdating with 
itself would lead to inconsistency for if a downdate with  is possible at all it will never lead to incon
sistency Also the negation of a downdate with  cannot be construed as the assertion that downdating
with  is impossible for the impossibility of a downdate with  just means that  is a logical truth
An update transition is a transition  with the property that ss

implies s v s

 The presupposition of
an update transition is the set fs  S j s

w s  ss

g This set is characterized by hi	 The content
of an update transition is the set fs  S j ssg This set is characterized by x 
Negating an update 
u
can be construed as updating with the assertion that making update  itself
would yield inconsistency Thus we can stipulate
 
u
  
u
 
u

If we dene 
u

 
u

as  
u


u

 update implication and 
u

t 
u

as  
u


u

 update dis
junction then we can easily derive
   F
u
   F
u

  F
u
  G
u
   F   G
u

  F
u
t G
u
   F G
u

In the general case where an update transition  may have a presupposition we have two options either
the negation preserves the presupposition or it cancels it We will explore the rst option Suppose  is
an upward transition Then we dene  as follows

def
 hi	  
u

Thus  has the same presupposition as  but it updates to the minimal states where updating with
 would yield inconsistency
As regards the second option an obvious choice for a denition of negated updating which cancels
presuppositions is  
u
 This is an update to a state where doing  itself would lead to inconsistency
Now suppose  has a presupposition let us say  p and assume p holds in the current state Then
 
u
would loop in the current state showing that  
u
does not have  p as presupposition
If we spell out the semantics for  we get this
  A B
where
A  fhs s

i  S  S j s v s

 s

h wi for some w
and for all s

with svs

v s

 s

h wi for some w
s

v s

g
and
B  fhs s

i j s v s

 s j g
Note that the earlier stipulation for  
u
 is a special case of this
We can now dene dynamic implication and dynamic disjunction for the general case of update transitions


and 

 To calculate what happens to presuppositions under dynamic implication we can make use
of the fact that
  F G
u
   F G
u
and of the fact that for all 
hi	 
 hi	
This is just a reection of the fact that  has the same presupposition as 
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Here is the calculation for presupposition under dynamic implication
h F

 G
u

  F

 G
u

i	

 h  F

 G
u

  F

 G
u

i	

 h  F

 G
u

 F

 G
u

i	

 h F

 G
u

 F

 G
u

i	

  F

 h G
u

i F


  F

 G

  F


For presupposition under dynamic disjunction we get
h F

 G
u

 t  F

 G
u

i	

 h   F

 G
u

  F

 G
u

i	

 h  F

 G
u

 F

 G
u

i	

 h F

 G
u

 F

 G
u

i	

  F

 h G
u

i F


  F

 G

 F


Thus calculating presuppositions of complex updates in terms of assertions and presuppositions of their
components gives the following table
update procedure presupposition
 F

 G
u

  F

 G
u

  F

 G

  F


  F G
u
  F 
 F

 G
u

  F

 G
u

  F

 G

  F


 F

 G
u

 t  F

 G
u

  F

 G

 F


This is a boxed version of Karttunens table of presupposition projection for and not if then and
or
	 Digression
 Error States
The treatment of presupposition failure in terms of error states of van Eijck 	

 van Eijck 	

 is
motivated by an obvious parallel between presupposition failure in natural language and error abortion
in imperative programming Consider the program statement 
 x  yz
If at the point of execution of this statement register z happens to contain the value  then execution
will be aborted with an error statement like Floating point error division by zero attempted
 IF z   THEN x  yz
In the statement  the dangerous case of z   is tested for in the program code and the danger of
error abortion is staved o
This suggests analyzing presupposition failure as moving to an error state Taking error abortion into
account in the semantics of deterministic imperative programming boils down to changing the semantic
interpretation function for program statements into a partial function error abortion is the case where
there is no next state
The epistemic state of a program always consists of the current memory state so it turns out that error
abortion analysis arises as a special case of the present epistemic analysis where there are just two state
sets hfwg wi the consistent state and h wi the inconsistent state Thus we get
Success case wp  	 wq  	
hfwg wi p q
u
hfwg wi
Failure case wp  	 wq  
hfwg wi p q
u
h wi
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Error abortion case wp  
hfwg wi p q
u
 ERROR 
In nondeterministic imperative programming program statements are interpreted as relations Taking
error abortion into account here means changing the interpretation relation into a partial relation Ex
ecuting a program statement  in state s now gives three possibilities 	 there are proper next states
and maybe the program can also make a transition to error  there are no next states and 
the program can only make a transition to the error state Again an error state semantics for dynamic
predicate logic Groenendijk and Stokhof 	

	 in the style of van Eijck 	

 turns out to be a special
case of the present epistemic analysis where there is just one rst order model around and where the
possible states are the assignment functions over this single model intuitively the states encode the
interpretations for indenite noun phrases that are still in the running In this setup an update with
presupposition for the king of France is bald could be rendered as  !xKx x KxBx
u
 This
gets us into the topic of the next section
  Presupposition and Quantication
As an example of a presupposition of quantied expressions we look at the case of uniqueness presup
positions of singular denite descriptions Dynamic versions of predicate logic have been proposed to
deal with growth of information about anaphoric possibilities of a piece of natural language text The
most important ones of these are le change semantics Heim 	
 discourse representation theory
Kamp 	
	 and dynamic predicate logic Groenendijk and Stokhof 	

	 This kind of dynamics can
be but need not be combined with the dynamics of information updating using predicate logical formu
las Here we will concentrate on epistemic dynamics for purposes of exposition and sketch a system of
information updating for standard predicate logic
To model information growth in predicate logic the simplest possible setup connes attention to one
particular predicate logical model M for the language under consideration and then uses sets of variable
assignments for that model as information states Thus if M  hdom M  int M i is given and if V is
the set of variables for the predicate logical language under consideration then A  dom M 
V
is the set
of assignments and S  fhi ai j i  A a  Ag is the set of information states The relation v on S is
given by s v s

i s  hi ai s

 hj ai and i  j Absurd information states are states of the form h ai
Fix a language L let a set of individual constants C and a set of predicate constants P
n
where n denotes
the arity of the constant be given Assume V is a set of individual variables Assume c  C v  V 
R  P
n

t  c j v
   j Rt

   t
n
j t

 t

j  j 



 j v
Let L

be the language that allows epistemic statements over L
	   j  j  
The Tarskian satisfaction relation M j
a
 is dened in the usual manner In terms of this we dene an
interpretation for L

ie a specication function  as follows
  fs  S j s  hi ai and M j
a
g
  fhi ai  S j a

 i with M j
a
 
g
   fhi ai  S j a

 i M j
a
 
g
The dynamically extended language now becomes
t  c j v
   j Rt

   t
n
j t

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
j  j 

 

 j 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	   j  j   j dom  j ran  j x 
  	
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



Minimal updates are dened as before The denitions of the dynamic operators are the same as before
Again presuppositions are given by dom  and assertions by x  The distinction between presup
Presuppositions and Information Updating  
position failure and updating with a piece of information inconsistent with the current information state
is given by no further transition possible versus transition to an absurd state

 The king of France is eating a frog
An update with the information expressed by 
 is expressed in this format as 	
	  !xKx xKx yFy Exy
u

The presupposition is given by
		 h !xKx xKx yFy Exy
u
i	
This is equivalent to
	  !xKx
The assertion is given by
	 x  !xKx xKx yFy Exy
u

This is equivalent to
	  !xKx xKx  yFy Exy
Note that because our epistemic states are based on a single rst order model the epistemic operators 
and   are not very expressive They serve to make the distinction between being able to make an update
to an absurd state uttering a falsehood and not being able to make a further transition at all error
abortion Indeed since possible worlds are variable assignments if F is a predicate logical formula
without free variables then the dierence between  F and F shows up only in absurd information
states
Of course the epistemic modalities become more expressive once we redene our information states in
terms of sets of rst order models
   Conclusion
We have sketched a system of epistemic dynamic logic to model presupposition and presupposition failure
Lots of logical questions remain to be answered For instance is the logic of propositional up and
downdating decidable We conjecture that it is What does a complete axiomatisation of this logic look
like What are the properties of the systems one gets by imposing further conditions on the information
structures What do the obvious variations on the combination of presupposition and quantication
look like The simplest variation is to replace standard predicate logic by dynamic predicate logic
This yields the dynamic error state semantics of van Eijck 	

 Another variation is to replace states
based on single rst order models by states based on sets of models This gives an epistemic rst
order update logic Finally we can combine the two in various ways see Eijck and Cepparello 	

 and
Groenendijk et al 	

 In all cases the main thing is to get at the right denition of the information
structure hSvi Jaspars and Krahmer 	

 provide a very useful starting point for this in the form of
an overview of current systems of dynamic logic from the perspective of information structures
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